

# Origins of structure in perception

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Vision in Art and Neuroscience  
2023



# Disappearance of structure in perception

## Stabilized Images on the Retina

*When the involuntary movements of an image across the retina are prevented, the image fades and reappears in a manner that provides new information on two major theories of perception*

by Roy M. Pritchard



STABILIZED IMAGES typically fade as in the illustrations on this and the following two pages. The parts of a profile drawing that stay visible are invariably specific features or groups of features, such as the front of the face or the top of the head.




MEANINGLESS CURLICUES first come and go in random sequence. But after a while small groups of curlicues organized in recognizable patterns start to behave as units. This suggests that they have themselves become meaningful perceptual elements.



MONOGRAM formed of the letters *H* and *B* also seems to illustrate the importance of elements that are meaningful because of past experience. When the monogram breaks up it is the recognizable letters and numbers within it that come successively into view.





WORDS containing other words behave in much the same manner as the monogram. Here, for example, the subject sees new words made up of letters and parts of letters in the original. He is far less likely to report seeing meaningless groups of letters such as *EER*.









Minor White *Windowsill Daydreaming*  
July 1958










# How do the eyes receive information about the world?

## 425 BCE: Intromission theories

- Objects emit copies of themselves (eidola or simulacra) that enter the eyes
- Advanced by Epicurus, Lucretius, Demokritos, among others
- How could objects send copies to multiple observers?  
How did the copies not interfere with one another?  
How could copies of large objects *fit into the eye*?



## ~400 BCE: Extramission theories

- Empedocles, Plato, Euclid
- Empedocles: all things are composed of 4 elements: fire, earth, air, water. The eye contains the 4 elements and **fire is responsible for creating rays that emanate from the eye and touch the world** (this fire is why cats' eyes glow!)
- Later, Aristotle:
  - stars too far away for rays from the eyes to reach them!
  - some objects are light sources and others reflect rays that reach the eyes
  - water** is the element of perception as vision needed a transparent element!(Aristotle, *On Sense and the Sensible*, 350 BCE)





# Light travels along straight lines – coming from where?

**325 BCE:** Euclid, a first mathematical theory of vision  
(in *Optics*)

- Rays emitted *by the eye* traveled along a straight line and formed a cone reaching the scene
- Work set basis for **perspective**

*Nothing that is seen is seen at once in its entirety. (Fig. 1).*

For let the thing seen be  $AD$ , and let the eye be  $B$ , from which let the rays of vision fall,  $BA$ ,  $BG$ ,  $BK$ , and  $BD$ . So, since the rays of vision, as they fall, diverge from one another, they could not fall in continuous line upon  $AD$ ; so that there would be spaces also in  $AD$  upon which the rays of vision would not fall. So  $AD$  will not be seen in its entirety at the same time. But it seems to be seen all at once because the rays of vision shift rapidly.

*Objects located nearby are seen more clearly than objects of equal size located at a distance. (Fig. 2.)*




FIG. 1.




FIG. 2.


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- *Book of Optics* (1028-1038 CE): light rays bounce off objects in all directions and become visible when they reach the eye perpendicularly




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From “Total Internal Reflection” – VAN 2020, <https://vision.mit.edu/tir>

# Helmholtz: Perception as Inference

**1821-1894:** *Hermann von Helmholtz*

The general rule determining the ideas of vision that are formed whenever an impression is made on the eye, is that *such objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism, the eyes being used under ordinary normal conditions.*


*Treatise on Physiological Optics* (1866)

- The mind makes perceptions out of sensations finding representations of the object most likely to explain the sensory input.
- Related to Bayesian methods for computer vision inference.

The human visual system recovers scenes that are the  
*cause* of images




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


Roger Shephard's Turning Tables (1990)

# The human visual system recovers scenes that are the *cause* of images



Roger Shephard's Turning Tables (1990)



Adelson's Checkershadow Illusion (1995)

Perception as inference and explanation, not as measurement

The human visual system recovers scenes that are the  
*cause* of images



*Hoarfrost at Ennery*, Camille Pissarro. Oil on canvas, 1873



# The human visual system recovers scenes that are the *cause* of images

## Helmholtz 1871 lecture

“We must look upon artists as persons whose observation of sensuous impressions is particularly vivid and accurate, and whose memory for these images is particularly true ... The study of works of art will throw great light on the question as to which elements and relations of our visual impressions are most predominant in determining our conception of what is seen.” (Helmholtz, 1995) (p.280), quoted in (Hyman, 2010).



These scrape marks are sufficient to convey the appearance of a heavily frosted field.

*Hoarfrost at Ennery*, Camille Pissarro. Oil on canvas, 1873

# The human visual system recovers scenes that are the *cause* of images – how?

Origins of Structure in Perception: this will take us a semester to answer!

- Low level vision
- Motion and depth
- Color
- Recognition
- Association

And in parallel:

“We must look upon artists as persons whose observation of sensuous impressions is particularly vivid and accurate, and whose memory for these images is particularly true ... The study of works of art will throw great light on the question as to which elements and relations of our visual impressions are most predominant in determining our conception of what is seen.” (Helmholtz, 1995) (p.280), quoted in (Hyman, 2010).

# Perception as an inverse problem

Pizlo 2000

“perception is about inferring the properties of the distal stimulus  $X$  given the proximal stimulus  $Y$ ”

$$Y = AX$$

where

$Y$  is the proximal stimulus (e.g. retinal image)

$X$  is the distal stimulus (e.g. 3D object)

$A$  is a perspective mapping (linear transformation)



$$X = A^{-1}Y$$

ill-posed, determining a  
unique  $A^{-1}$  is difficult

many different things could have created the same retinal image (e.g. of a cube)

Less clear why binocular reconstruction of a 3D scene is ill-posed  
(e.g. Gibson: observer knows position of one eye relative to the other, reconstruction is well-posed and well-conditioned)

Problem: perceptual and motor noise

- Rays never actually intersect
- One could approximate the intersection, but the approximation is very unstable (small variations in the noise cause large variations in the solution)

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to solve:  $X = A^{-1}Y \longrightarrow E_1 = \|AX - Y_X\|^2 + \lambda \|P_X\|^2$

regularized linear regression:

Bayes' rule:

$$p(X|Y_X) = \frac{p(Y_X|X)p(X)}{p(Y_X)}$$

$$-\log p(X|Y_X) = -\log p(Y_X|X) - \log p(X)$$

# Predictive Coding

“the brain is in the game of optimizing neuronal dynamics and connectivity to maximize the evidence for its model of the world” (Friston 2018, “Does Predictive Coding Have a Future?”)

- neuronal representations in higher/deeper levels of hierarchies generate predictions about representations in lower levels
- descending predictions are compared with lower-level representations to form a prediction error, which is passed back up the hierarchy to update higher-level representations
- The recurrent exchange of signals between adjacent levels encodes a *generative model* – generating predictions of sensations that can be compared with actual sensory samples


Published: January 1999

## Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects

Rajesh P. N. Rao  & Dana H. Ballard


*Nature Neuroscience* 2, 79–87 (1999) | [Cite this article](#)

41k Accesses | 2756 Citations | 112 Altmetric | [Metrics](#)




From Fong et al. 2020

# Bayesian Models of Object Perception



“It seems reasonable to assume that an effective perceptual system should obtain and use knowledge of the constraints that characterize the distal stimuli to ‘make up’ for the information that has been lost in the transformation from the distal to proximal stimulus.”  
(Pizlo 2000)



unlikely  likely  
prior probability

to solve:  $X = A^{-1}Y$

constraints!

object  
descriptions,  $S$





image data,  $I$

telling the robot what they are seeing. If you could see the world through a robot's eyes, it would look not like a movie picture decorated with crosshairs but something like this:


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221 229 218 230 228 214 213 209 198 224 161 140 133 127
220 219 224 220 219-215 215 206 206 221 159 143 133 131
221 215 211 214 220 218 221 212 218 204 148 141 131 130
214 211 211 218 214 220 226 216 223 209 143 141 141 124
211 208 223 213 216 226 231 230 241 199 153 141 136 125
200 224 219 215 217 224 232 241 240 211 150 139 128 132
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191 194 209 238 245 255 249 235 238 197 146 139 130 132
189 199 200 227 239 237 235 236 247 192 145 142 124 133
198 196 209 211 210 215 236 240 232 177 142 137 135 124
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216 209 214 220 210 231 245 219 169 143 148 129 128 136
211 210 217 218 214 227 244 221 162 140 139 129 133 131
215 210 216 216 209 220 248 200 156 139 131 129 139 128
219 220 211 208 205 209 240 217 154 141 127 130 124 142
229 224 212 214 220 229 234 208 151 145 128 128 142 122
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unlikely  likely  
prior probability








adapted from Kersten & Yuille (2003)



adapted from Kersten & Yuille (2003)



eliminate everything in world model that could not generate the image (likelihood) prior probability then organizes that narrower possibility space.




adapted from Kersten & Yuille (2003)









adapted from Kersten & Yuille (2003)



# Visual system embodies principles of ecological optics

- Lighting from above, shadows, reflection, ...

“evolutionary internalized regularities”

tion consisting of a checkerboard with a visual interpretation is ambiguous. The




FIG. 1 A central square superimposed over a checkerboard pattern was made to move forth directly along the line of sight. The coincidental alignment of motion and viewing combined with the use of orthographic projection, resulted in an image of the square and position did not vary over time. A rectangular light panel illuminated the scene from above and to the left of the square, generating a cast shadow which moved diagonally and whose brightness decreased as the central patch moved away from the checkerboard. The left and right panels show the first and last frames from a 24-frame sequence which was played forward and backward in a 48-frame loop at 15 frames  $s^{-1}$ .




NATURE · VOL 379 · 4 JANUARY 1996





images from Midjourney (2023)

# Learned (?) Models in Art



possible renderings of a common shape are infinite but no problem!

Koenderink (2014)

clarence coles phillips (1880-1927)

# The Beholder's Share

**1909-2001:** Ernst Gombrich, Austrian art historian

“draws [the beholder] into the magic circle of creation and allows him to experience something of the thrill of ‘making’ which had once been the privilege of the artist”  
(Gombrich, 1961) (p. 202).



Clarence Coles Phillips



Camille Pissarro



Paul Cezanne

# The Beholder's Share

## Perceptual Metamerization:

- Stimuli that differ physically but look the same (from a particular distance and point of fixation)
- Creation requires a model of perceptual processing
- For example, spatial pooling, both in successive ventral stream areas, and with eccentricity, induces an irretrievable loss of information:



[Nat Neurosci](#). Author manuscript; available in PMC 2012 Mar 1.

Published in final edited form as:

[Nat Neurosci](#). 2011 Sep; 14(9): 1195–1201.

Published online 2011 Aug 14. doi: [10.1038/nn.2889](#)

## Metamers of the ventral stream

[Jeremy Freeman](#)<sup>1</sup> and [Eero P. Simoncelli](#)<sup>1,2,3</sup>

# The Beholder's Share

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Koenderink 2012:


**QUESTION:** Is perception like a bundle of possible visual worlds (then the observer apparently abstains from a final – precognitive – decision) or is it like a single visual world (the observer really “sticks the neck out”) ?

In other words, do observers resolve ambiguities when not required for an action or decision?



Minor White *Windowsill Daydreaming*  
July 1958

QUESTION: Is perception like a bundle of possible visual worlds (then the observer apparently abstains from a final – precognitive – decision) or is it like a single visual world (the observer really “sticks the neck out”)?



I think that in a great many cases perceptions are more of the many visual worlds variety than like the single guess. You don't notice this in the laboratory because most psychophysical methods *force a unique response*. They simulate the decisions-in-action of daily life. That you don't notice the essential ambiguity of perception in real life is most likely due to the fact that you don't need to take decisions on issues on which no actions will be taken anyway. That the many visual worlds option is indeed likely is suggested by the fact that a change of psychophysical method or task often leads to distinctly different results. This is not to say that observers actually entertain many visual worlds interpretations explicitly, but merely that they don't necessarily resolve ambiguities when this is not specifically required for some action or decision.

*Multiple Worlds (2012)*

**Consciousness: facing the consequences of decisions-in-action? (Schrodinger)**






Bev Doolittle, *Pintos* (2000)

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*Multiple Worlds* (2012)



## Consciousness: facing the consequences of decisions-in-action? (Schrodinger)

Do decisions have consequences when looking at art?

Non-representational art?




*Kandinsky* (1912)




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*Multiple Worlds* (2012)



## Consciousness: facing the consequences of decisions-in-action? (Schrodinger)

What is the nature of your visual awareness? A single visual world?



*Joseph Mallord William Turner (Interior at Petworth c. 1837)*